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Introduction
Much has been wntten of late regardmg the advent of new mformatron technologres, new weapons systems and platforms, and mtelhgence archrtectures offermg to fuse real-time mfonnatron that will a&eve total battlefield awareness The excitement that these advances and the ongomg Revolutron m
Mrbtary Affarrs brmg to the mrhtary strategist 1s palpable Whrle acknowledgmg we are on the cusp of a wondrous new technologrc landscape, however, much uncertamty IS expressed as to 1% hat exactly these technology breakthroughs wA1 bnng what they wA1 do, how they w111 change how we hve and wage war, and how they will shape our world Concurrently, the end of the Cold War shattered the comfortable br-polar world the US mhabrted, sendmg everyone, the mrlrtary strategrst mcluded, scurrymg to find a new roadmap Kew challenges are destabihzmg the mternatronal arena, while at home the burgeoning mformatron culture encourages crtrzens and polrtrcmns to demand better performance and msrst on more mvolvement m mihtary decrsron-makm, 0 Modern teclmologres are expensrve to b&d and deploy and the mrhtary 1s mcreasmgly asked to contrrbute on the full spectrum of engagement, yet budgets are trght and nA1 get tighter Socretal and eprstemologrcal changes are dnvmg the trde of Post-modermsm, questronmg the very valrdrty of '-truth", and are Just begmnmg to send out npples whrch wrll affect the fabric of society wh+ch underguds the mrhtary In short, the world 1s m flux on multrple levels, famrhar tenam has been left behmd. and many anxrously lament that the future 1s shrouded by a fog of uncertamty
Whrle the course and components of the future may not be prehctable, there 1s one constant that can serve as a benchmark the human mind, whose perceptual construct of reality and mtellectual paradigm defines how expenence 1s measured and reahty denved The human bemg IS always in the equatron, and the mtellectual approach and tools which are brought to bear m addressmg the conundrum of managmg developments m the fog of the future are cntrcal Developmg a valid mtellectual approach for national leadership, mcludmg the mrhtary strategrst, is the first step m beginning to meet the challenges ahead 1 The Seed for a sew Intellectual Paradlm "-iVo predmon about our socral life seems more certarn thun that cornpIe-uc,l M 111 mcrease and change wrli qu&en" D\+qght Waldo
The tradltlonal vlslon can no longer stretch to accommodate the growmg complexrty of the world A new intellectual paradigm 1s needed from which to view the world and ldentlfjr the requirements for strategic leaderstip In a post-modem era The -'new sciences" of Chaos and compleuty theory hold promise of formmg thy basis for the new paradigm They propose that structure and determnustic rules underlie the non-linear phenomena not considered bq the Kewtoman construct Indeed, scientific research over the past 3 3 years, based largely on advances m computers and computational mathematics, has pro\ lded insights and tools for the stud) and appllcatlon of non-hear system dynamics 3
Stemming from the "new sciences" of Chaos and Complexity, these Post-modem tools are creating a new scientific paracl,gm replacing the Newtoman linear construct Although m the nascent stages of non-sclentlfic apphcahon, the new sciences non-linear paradigm promises great potential for a truly profound lqtellectual sh& The military strategst must command a thorough understandmg of these tools--characterized by the interdependence of elements, complex adaptive systems and non-pre&ctabrhty--to re-examine beliefs, adapt new ones as con&tlons change, gain clanty m interpreting events m the external em n-onment and divelop orgamzatlonal structures more conducive to dealing with change through self-orgamzatron and adaptation Kew metaphors must replace the old Thus, synthesis 'Meny, Un, Conme \7th Uncertamty, Chapters l-9 311achmskl, Andrew, ,Land Warfare and Comdexlty, Part II, Tier l-8 3 .
replaces analy-tlc, becoming replaces being, quahtatl~ e replaces quantrtatl\ e, inherent disorder replaces order, process and adaptation replaces solutron, hohshc replaces reductromsm, and disorder ansmg from wrthm the system replaces disorder as ongmatmg from outside the sys-em 4
Kev Concents of the New Paradrm
Several key concepts of this new paradigm are of partrcular import to the strategrst m creating a new metaphor for a shrftmg reali@ j * Non-lmeantv systems that are not proportronal and do not neatly add up Instead, they are composed of sy nergrstrc mteractrons of many elements m here the whole IS not necessarrly the sum of Its parts They are highly sensmve to changes m rmtsal condrtrons, thus can display a disproportronal small or large output for any gn en input *Emergence behallors or propertres that result from mteractrons wrthm the system which differ from the elements in the system, and which are not found m nor are directly deducible from the systems'
properties The w hoIe IS something greater and different from its parts--it IS transformed mto something new A hohstrc approach IS needed to understand a complex system * Self-org&nzatron Patterns of order that emerge from internal system dynamics wrthout any "control-'
imposed from external forces Complex systems adapt to their environments, and instead of tendmg toward disorder, they tend to self-orgamze mto more highly ordered states The ultrmate equrhbrmm, but one m which the dispersal and/or loss of the systems energy system 1s incapable of change * Feedback loops CompIex systems process mformatron obtained from the envnonment and react to rt based on then own intemahzed processes, m effect learning A system must create and mamtam these loops con+ntly to keep healthy and ah\ e Thus, robust mtelhgence sy stems and effective internal dralogue are cntical * Brfurcatron. Chaos and complexrtv Chaos and complexrty are pomts of exrstence on a contmuum that progresses from stasrs, through steady state, to complexrty, and finally, to chaos Thrs contmuum IS srmrlar to a decrslon tree stasrs or equrhbnum, exists at the far left of the tree where few chorces, or brfmcatron pomts exrst, systems are defunct m this area The sy stem progresses through a steady state to complexrty, where there are more choices--four to eight possible "futures", or solutrons to any problem, thus, four to eight blfircatron points These are optrmal futures, meamng they are all valid optrons, and are not an "optrmum" solutron, rmplymg the best The best place for a system to exist IS m the range of complexrty, on the edge of chaos, where rt is most alive and dynamrc After thel6th brfirrcatron point, on the far nght of the tree, 1s Chaos, where the system becomes chaohc and brfurcatron points can no longer be rdentrfied Understandmg and applying the key concepts of the non-linear paradigm can help the strategrst know where he 1s aIong this contmuum, and help hrm move m the correct direction
The new pdradrgm crews Chaos and complex@ not as the exceptron, but as the rule Currently, the neoatrve "WI" concepts--such as unpredrctabrlrty, uncertamty, and the unknown--are avoided m favor of Z order, stab&y, and control As the complexrty contmuum deprcts, order and stability can easrly lead to stasis and entrophy As the Tofflers observed, "most of reality, instead of being orderly, stable andequlllbnal IS seethmg and bubbling \+7th change, drsorder and process, and that chaos IS not unusual a*6
The strategist must be enabled to deal \jlth this new reality
The new non-linear mteIlectua1 paradigm ulll grow leaders at every level \\ ho thnve on Chaos, who can accept amblpty to manage a world where rapid change and increasing mstabrhty \mIl conunually threaten t,o turn their world upside down They v&l expect It, and because they have the mtellectual tools to acknowIedge and deal with tlus dynamic entlronrnent, they will not unnecessanly fear It By creating a "comfort zone", the new approach w11l help the strate,olst 1) prepare for and manage uncertainty, \+hch 1s the accep#ed norm, 2) lscem emergmg patterns m the envrronment and unfolding etents, 3) sustam hope that the situation can be manipulated--not controlled, for that IS a theoretlcal unposslblllty, but that events can be shaped toward the objective licatio~ "Chaos IS the r&z sodfrom whclz creutwrty zs born " Un Merry
The new parade-m will change how the strategst perceives and addresses a host of pressing issues These concepts have been well applied to command and control issues, most notably m the operational arena by the XJanne Corps 7 Its relevance to the nature of war itself 1s readily apparent, for operational engagements and the wagmg of war 1s a most complex and chaotic event, a phenomena covered \\qth remarkablie lucl&ty by Clausew& * If pretlously it was "he who had the most toys wms", today It 1s "he who adapts first wms" Thus, there are ad&honal areas that must be more fully explored using the new paradigm 6Toffler A '-New Science of Instabllrty Throws Light on Poht~s", p 4 'Marme'Corps Co ncept paper 6, "Command and Control", 12 December, 1995 *For example, Clausem7tz's observation that "the multlpllcrty of forms that combat assumes leads us m as many different dlrectlons as are created by the multlphclty of alms", reflects the blfircatlons possible m conflict Alan Beyerchen presents a compellmg case m "Clausew&, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredlctablllty of War", 1992-93 6
The mtematronal envrronment IS a perfect example of a complex system, 1% here mmor events can start a chain reaction that can lead to catastrophe By achrevmg a better match of paradigm to strategic anal) SE., one can better match means to ends The tradrtlonal approach, focused on quantity, leads one to overestimate its influence on events, drscountmg all but major players The new parade-gm, by focusing on pattern, ackno\x ledges that minor actors can have a disproportronally great impact, and that desired patterns can be shaped Externally imposed long-term stabrlrty IS not a defining feature of the world Instead, internal attractors that can cause the system to self-organize must be identified and supported, creating new multiple strategres across orgamzatronal umts because a single sn-ate,y IS unhkely to succeed Umt plannmg IS very Important, for adaptive change occurs from the bortom up
The role of management itself wrll change It must reflect and adjust for the mevrtable vanations that ~11 occur overtrme, for stable goals m an unstable world do not accept vanatron Management's new role IS that of liberator, not controller, It must allow freedom, not impose unnecessary controls The arm . IS not to translate the ideal mto action by employees but rather to mobrhze the mtelhgence of all to promote the mrssion It must serve as a catalyst for change The need for contmual feedback requires 1) a flattened hierarchy, wrth less emphasis on the tradrtronal structure, 2) focus on key processes that are well designed to promote objectrves such as quality and produchvity, and not on specrfic bureaucratic procedures It must encourage and reward feedback from those directly engaged in the process lo The notion of self-orgamzation demands constant revolutronary change Contmuous IMOL anon does not mean that plateaus are not reached, but that the manager 1s never satisfied "Good enough" 1s not Adopting the mevrtabrlrty of uncertamty allows the manager to 1) recogmze the dynamics of rnstabilrty to gam msrghts on why change happens and 2) accept his new role While the concept of self-orgamzatron may seem to obvrate the need for the manager, but rt does not--h.tsJob descnptron has snnply changed to that of determmmg m here small nudges are needed to change processes and alter relatronshrps * 1 New modelmn and srmulatron efforts must use non-linear modes wrth open, not closed, system dynamics and multiple non-canonical scenarios They must inject mstabrlrty and uncertainty into computer nms and sensrtrvrty analysts to mrmrc unmtended outcomes of tactical through strategic action Models must The new paradigm Training leadership 1s cntical--and everyone 1s a leader m a flattened hierarchy suggests success begms at the bottom, ~7th expenenced and empowered mdrr iduals and teams The truly adaptive system places its assets at the action level, ~th direct access to feedback (customer, opposrtron force etc j and fully capable and authorized to take adaphve action Leaders must be comfortable \+7th making decrsrons based on uncertamty, reachmg beyond mcomplete data to seek out new methods and resources The objective IS to satrsfise, not to optrmrze, because there IS more than one solutron to any problem The desire for certainty m an uncertam world freezes achon and 1s a psychologrcal constraint on decrslon-makmg Fusing the other attractors mto a cohesrve whole 1s the orgamzattonal culture It may drffer by Sen Ice, component and umt, and need not look the same outwardly to adhere to the new paradigm It must however, serve as a umfier of purpose v\lthout creatmg mtellectual "lock-m" or dullmg mitratrve It must value the feedback rt receives, rei\ardmg risk takers and maven& The culture must pursue "perpetual novelty", for a system requires novel solutrons to adapt to novel srtuatrons l3 Not all soluhons ~111 work as planned, thus the system must accept errors Indeed failure, d rts lessons are learned and applied, can be more meanmgful to a system than success To fall m this creates a culture that 1s nsk averse, frozen by uncertamty and incapable of contendmg wrth change It would e?ust on the far left of the brfurcahon contrnuum, at stasis Thus, rt IS cnhcal for the organizahon to recognize and reward new ways of thmkmg and doing things that expedite the mission, regardless of the established "rules" By mtentronally creahng a diverse workforce, it can generate cultural plurahsm, not because thus IS a pohtrcally correct move, but because rt is a way to ensure Ievels of mstabrlny to generate renewal and provide new insights 13Schm~tt, p 28
Conclusioh
The gro\\ mg mterconnectedness of the world, Its orgamzatlonal systems and the rate of change fueled by technolog calls for a hohstlc approach to discern patterns of emergence, requrnng the skills of a post-modem noettlcus, the equivalent of the "Renaissance man" for our time Technological expertise and speclallzatlon have made important contnbutlons But, concentration on tis arena has for too long Ignored the requirement for a breadth of mtellectual vlslon based upon a mastery of non-linear, complex SJ stem dynamics using the most powerM and adaphve computer of all--the human mmd It is, m essence, the post-modem development of Clausewtz's coup d'oell that leads to the "glrmmenngs of the mner light whch leads to truth l4 A non-linear mtellectual para&gm can liberate strategic thought and proklde more realrstlc pohcles for an age of change 14ClausewS.z, On War. p lc2 11
